public

No. 399
August 30, 1941
No number.
FROM: Helsinki (Sakaya)
TO: Washington

(Message to Tokyo #260.) (Part 1 of 3.) Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

The other day the American Minister here invited me to a luncheon, and I took that opportunity to ridicule the attitude of the United States in sponsoring Great Britain, Chungking, etc. I said that it was peculiar that the United States should back up the Soviet which is diametrically opposed to the democratic principle. The Minister said that he had not received any detailed reports from Washington on the present attitude of the government but he imagined that his country considered it essential to back up Russia against a greater threat. As for Bolshevism, he said that the view of the United States was that because of what the Soviet has been through for the past ten years, Bolshevism cannot possibly constitute a very great threat to other nations.

Trans. 10-13-41

No. 400
August 30, 1941
No number.
FROM: Helsinki (Sakaya)
TO: Washington

(Part 2 of 3.) (Message to Tokyo #260.)

I said, "Well, don't you think it would be a good idea to have all nations get together and make peace?" and he replied, "Yes, I agree with you." I then pointed out how ridiculous it was for the United States to meddle in Europe and Asia and at the same time cling to the Monroe Doctrine. He replied, "In general, I might be inclined to agree with you; however, we have to face changing situations. In any case, I think this is only a temporary state of affairs. In general, there is a mistaken idea throughout the world concerning our Monroe Doctrine. By it we forbid any foreign country to seize control of any part of the American continent, and at the same time we imply that we do not wish to control any other country. I do not know what Germany intends to do with Europe. However, it would seem that she is contravening the principle of self-determination, thus shattering the foundations of peace between the old and new worlds. This would upset the economic equilibrium, and the United States intends to prevent any such thing."

Trans. 10-13-41

No. 401
August 30, 1941
No number.
FROM: Helsinki
TO: Washington

(Message to Tokyo #260.) (Part 3 of 3.)

I said, "Well, be that as it may, the American attitude toward Japan isn't doing the world situation any good. Just like the Asama Maru incident last year. American shipments of material for Russia via Vladivostok are inciting the Japanese people and officials exceedingly, so the United States had better watch out." The Ambassador answered, "Well don't you think that the present bad blood between our two countries is only a passing phenomenon? As long

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as our leaders continue to talk things through, I think that naturally there is a good chance for a composure of relations between our two countries. My present feeling is that it is important that we get along well to avoid a world disaster."

Trans. 10-13-41

No. 402
August 26, 1941
#66.
FROM: Hollywood (Nakauchi)
TO: Washington

(Message to Tokyo #163.)
Re your #489[a] to the United States.

1. Newspapers and magazines sent from Japan to private individuals here have on many occasions either been delayed or not received. Newspapers to semi-officials were received during August. Furthermore, there are clear indications that printed matter is being censored.

2. There is no actual proof.

3. As I told you in my #157[b], on that occasion, photostatic copies were made of (his) private letters and diary.

4. No examples have occurred.

5. In connection with the Tachibana incident, Naval officials were trailed and kept under surveillance as a matter of course. Since then too, persons having to do with the Army and the Navy have continued to be under surveillance. Capatain ISHIKAWA and Commander SASAKI of the Navy, who returned home on the tanker Otowasan Maru, underwent an examination by Customs Officials before boarding the steamer. Nevertheless, the F.B.I. subjected them to a rigorous examination.

6. No actual proof.

[a] Tokyo asks Washington for information with regard to the method in which the United States handles cases involving Japanese there. This is to be used as reference material in drawing up a reply to the United States' protest of Japan's decision to control the business of foreigners in Japan.
[b] See III, 380, 381.

Trans. 10-4-41

No. 403
August 27, 1941
#508.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

(In 3 parts—complete.)
Re my #473[a] and your #693[b].

On the 27th I handed the following as our answer to the American Ambassador in Tokyo and when the occasion arises please get in touch with the State Department concerning it.

1. Under the principal of reciprocity it is necessary in investigating the transactions of foreigners to exclude the American Ambassador, Consul, and employees together with the employees of other government offices resident in Japan from the other foreigners. (This arrangement is at present in effect between Japan and England, Australia, Canada and Holland. This arrangement exempts only personal accounts and does not include public funds and inasmuch

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

as the official in charge of receipts and disbursements as well as the other employees are exempted it is not only convenient in practice but also moneys in the bank (?) are also exempted.)

2. Inasmuch as American practice does not follow the above we are adding the following revisions to the American proposals before accepting them.

(1) In regard to paragraph (a) of the above memorandum, concerning the nature, and object of the payments of official accounts permission shall be given for-----for actual running expenses as telegraphic expenses, salaries of employees, rents, entertainment expenses, etc., it being mutually understood that the investigation of details be omitted. However in the matter of the purchase of office equipment or major repairs request be made for each occasion as it arises.

(2) That a permit not be required for each case of the receipt of money transferred to official accounts.

(3) That permit be granted for the embassy and consulate and other government offices to pay in to their national treasury the balance on hand of current operating expenses and funds arising from the disposal of assets as well as income received by the consulate in the conduct of its business also that employees be allowed to remit money to their home countries.

(4) In regard to paragraph (c) personal living expenses and travel for which permits are not required shall be 1500 yen a month in Japan and $500 a month in America, that is the standard for Japanese employees $500 and for American employees 1500 yen for personal living expenses and travel only. Permits shall be issued for the above amounts reciprocally and employees permits shall be granted as follows: Both Japan and America shall grant to their Ambassadors the sum of $2000 a month or its equivalent. To the Financial Attache $1000 or its equivalent. To the Counselor and the Military and Naval Attaches $1500 each or its equivalent. To the First Secretary $1000 or its equivalent. To the Consul and the Second Secretary group $750 or its equivalent.

When circumstances render necessary an amount greater than those indicated in the above the Ambassador shall make application for permit for each occasion as it occurs.

(5) The grants for employees above the rank of clerks of the Japanese Embassy and Consulate shall be sent by the Japanese Foreign Office direct to the individual concerned through the Yokohama Specie Bank and the American Government shall give the above-mentioned bank a general permit covering the above payments. (A list of the employees above the rank of clerk shall be furnished to the State Department by the Japanese Embassy in Washington.) Furthermore when the travel expenses, etc., remitted by the Japanese Foreign Office through the Yokohama Specie Bank shall exceed the $500 a month limit established in paragraph (4) above, permit for payment shall be granted upon request of the Embassy.

3. Furthermore, when I presented the memorandum I gave my opinion as follows:

(a) As far as Japan is concerned the above arrangement includes only the Japanese Empire, however if America for her part will promise to facilitate the clearing of dollar remittances to Japanese offices and employees in South America and Europe through New York and do her utmost to remove any obstacles, if in the future conditions should arise to permit the use of such funds by the aforesaid offices and employees, then I will recommend that the Manchurian Government and the Nanking Government accord the same treatment to American offices in Manchuria and that part of China that is occupied by Japanese forces as is accorded them in the Japanese Empire itself.

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(b) In regard to the operating expenses mentioned in paragraph (1) under paragraph (2) above the actual amount concerned is at present the subject of investigation and it is desired that a reciprocal report be made when the actual figures have been arrived at.

[a] See III, 376.
[b] Not available.

Trans. 9-5-41

No. 404
September 2, 1941
#521.
FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister)
TO: Washington

Re my #485[a].

As the result of subsequent negotiations by the Korean Governor General's office with the missionary authorities in Keijo[b], all thirteen of them have consented to evacuate. As a consequence, the Governor General's office has dismissed all pending litigation on record in the Public Procurator's office. This is being done with the view of settling all questions.

These missionaries are sailing for Shanghai on Japanese boats departing August 26 and September 16. They will board American vessels in Shanghai for the United States.

Furthermore, with regard to the settlement of this matter, as well as the Oasa incident mentioned in a previous wire, much has been accomplished through the personal endeavors of Governor General MINAMI. The above is for your information.

[a] See III, 382.
[b] Seoul—capital of Chosen.

Trans. 9-4-41

No. 405
September 4, 1941
#179.
FROM: Washington (UAWRK)
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, Gen. Staff)

(Parts 1 and 2.)

Part 1

In spite of the efforts of the American authorities concerned and other leading parties, it is easy to see that America's ardor in aiding Russia is less than in the case of Britain, which goes without saying, and very much less than in the case of aiding China.

Therefore in as far as we can go without injuring America's prestige, I think it would be proper for us to show our opposition to the sending of aid to Russia via Vladivostok, and as emergency measures to prevent this, we will, for example, place emphasis on the fact that our Navy will hold maneuvers in that area, that is in a mined area and set forth the case of the sinking of the TERUKUNI MARU, etc.

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Part 2

But it is a fact that if we use actual power[a] in preventing the (?passage of?) the above mentioned aid, America's pressure on us will be still further increased and eventually it can[b] result in the rupture of diplomatic relations and the opening of a warfare of commerce destruction.[c]

[a] JITSU RYOKU.
[b] KANOSEI NAKI TO SEZARU.
[c] TSUSHO HAKAISEN.